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A possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of Prelec’s 
(probability weighting) function  W(p)  at the probability  p = 1  
is discussed.  This possibility is supported by the Aczél–Luce 
question whether Prelec’s weighting function  W(p)  is equal to  
1  at  p = 1, by the purely mathematical restrictions and the 
“certain–uncertain” inconsistency of the random–lottery 
incentive experiments.  The results of the well-known 
experiments support this possibility as well.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The paper sketches very roughly a future article.  It will be included into a 
group of three articles.  Supposed titles of the articles are:  “A possible discontinuity 
of Prelec’s function,” “Certainty Effect near Certainty” and “A ”certain-uncertain” 
inconsistency of the random-lottery incentive system.”   
There are a number of theories concerned with one or another concept of 
utility.  They include, e.g., Bernoullian expected utility, von Neumann–Morgenstern 
expected utility, subjective expected utility, subjectively weighted utility theories 
(see, e.g., a review by Schoemaker, 1982); prospect theory (see Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
or, in other terminology, original prospect theory and prospect theory; the salience 
theory of choice under risk (see Bordalo, Gennaioli, Shleifer, 2012); expected 
uncertain utility theory (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014); etc. 
In the present paper these theories are referred to as utility and prospect 
theories. 
Ever since Bernoulli (1738), the problems with the theory of utility exposed 
by the Saint Petersburg paradox have been investigated. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) promised the feasibility of a correct and, naturally, rational 
foundation of economic theory with their book, Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. But these promises were dashed by the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953).  
Kahneman and Thaler (2006) pointed out that the basic problems of utility and 
prospect theories, including the paradoxes of Allais (Allais, 1953) and Ellsberg 
(Ellsberg, 1961), have not yet been adequately solved.  
The purpose of the present paper is to consider a possibility of the existence of 
a discontinuity of Prelec’s (probability weighting) function  W(p)  at the probability  
p = 1  in the context of these problems.   
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1.  The Aczél–Luce question whether  W(1) = 1   
 
An essential part of problems of utility and prospect theories consists in the 
problems that are connected with a probability weighting (see, e.g., Tversky and 
Wakker, 1995). A probability weighting means that subjects treat the probability  p  
by a probability weighting function  W(p)  which is not equal to  p  (see also 
uncertainty perception in (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014) as an example of perception 
variety).  I define the function  W(p)  both for uncertain (probable) and certain 
outcomes. Prelec’s weighting function (Prelec, 1998) is one of the most popular 
probability weighting functions.  
One possible way to solve the above problems is to consider the vicinities of 
the borders of the probability scale, e.g. at  p ~ 1  (see, e.g., Aczél and Luce, 2007).  
Aczél and Luce (2007) emphasized a fundamental question: whether  W(1) = 
1  (whether Prelec’s weighting function  W(p)  (see Prelec, 1998) is equal to  1  at  p 
= 1).  In this article, I refer to this question as the Aczél–Luce question (or Luce 
question.   
The answer  W(1) ≠ 1  to the Aczél–Luce question may mean the function  
W(p)  has a discontinuity at  p=1.  This is not a quantitative but a qualitative, 
moreover, a topological feature. So, the answer to the question can qualitatively 
change the situation in utility and prospect theories, at least in their mathematical 
aspects.  
 
 
2.  Purely mathematical restrictions  
 
Another possible way to solve the problems of utility and prospect theories 
has been widely discussed, e.g., in Schoemaker and Hershey (1992); Hey and Orme 
(1994); Chay, McEwan and Urquiola (2005); Butler and Loomes (2007); 
Galaabaatar and Karni (2013); Chambers and Hayashi (2014). Its essence consists 
in a proper attention to noise, uncertainty, imprecision, incompleteness, unforeseen 
contingencies and other reasons that might cause dispersion, scattering, a spread of 
the data.  
A purely mathematical investigation (see, e.g., Harin, 2010, 2012) has 
synthesized these two different ways. That is, it considers the dispersion of the data 
(or the influence of the dispersion of the data) near the borders of the probability 
scale.  
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Purely mathematical theorems (see, e.g., Harin, 2010, 2012) prove that the 
probability  p  cannot attain  1  under the condition of a non-zero dispersion of the 
data.  The theorems are presented in the form of a sequence of five lemmas and 
theorems: 
1) For a finite non-negative function on an interval  [0, 1],  an analog of the 
dispersion  D  is proved to tend to  0,  when the mean  M  of the function tends to 
any border of the interval.  
2) Hence, if the analog of the dispersion  D  is not less than a non-zero value, 
then non-zero restrictions exist on  M.  Namely,  M  cannot be closer to any border 
of the interval than a specific non-zero amount.  
This implies that under the condition of a non-zero dispersion  D,  the mean  
M  cannot attain  1.   
Note, that the restriction has opposite signs at the opposite borders of the 
interval. Hence, there is a point in the middle part of the interval, at which the 
restriction equals zero. Therefore, if the first derivative of the restriction does not 
change sign, then the restriction has its maximum absolute value at the borders and 
diminishes to zero at some point within the interval.  
3–4) As far as the probability estimation corresponds to such a function and a 
non-zero dispersion of data takes place, then non-zero restrictions exist on the 
probability estimation.  
This signifies that under the condition of a non-zero dispersion of data, the 
probability estimation cannot take on the value  1.   
5) As far as the probability is the limit of the probability estimation and a non-
zero dispersion of data takes place, then non-zero restrictions exist on the 
probability. Namely, the probability cannot be closer, than by a specific non-zero 
amount, to a border of the probability scale (see also, e.g., Li, 2013 for some 
considerations in the presence of data noise and jumps).  
This signifies that under the condition of a non-zero dispersion of the data, the 
probability  p  cannot take on the value  1,  i.e.,  p < 1.  It cannot even be arbitrarily 
close.  
As a matter of fact, a non-zero dispersion of data can be caused, e.g., by non-
zero noise, which is practically unavoidable in economics.  
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3.  A discontinuity of Prelec’s function 
 
There is a deal of evidence for the existence of a qualitative difference 
between subjects’ treatment of the probabilities of uncertain (probable) and certain 
outcomes (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; McCord and de Neufville, 1986; 
Gneezy, List and Wu, 2006; Halevy, 2008). Therefore, in the general case, one 
should distinguish between the values of the probability weighting function  W(p)  
of a certain outcome and the limit of the probability weighting function  W(p)  of 
uncertain outcomes as the probability of uncertain outcomes tends to  1.   
Let us additionally define or specify a value  WCertain  of the probability 
weighting function  W(p)  for a certain outcome. At that,  WCertain  may be assumed 
to be equal to  1.  Otherwise, other values of  W(p)  may be normalized by  WCertain.   
Let us here additionally specify a value  W(1)  as the limit of the probability 
weighting function  W(p)  for a probable (uncertain) outcome as  p  tends to  1   
)(lim)1(
1
pWW
p→
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 .  
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and  W(p)  can be continuous or discontinuous. 
One may modify the Aczél–Luce question whether  W(1) = 1  into the 
question whether  W(1) = WCertain  or whether  W(p)  is continuous at  p = 1.  Note, 
various aspects of continuity have been discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Aczél 
and Luce (2007), Kothiyal, Spinu and Wakker (2011), Delbaen, Drapeau and 
Kupper (2011), Spinu and Wakker (2013). 
To answer the modified question and to prove or disprove the continuity of  
W(p)  at  p=1  one should determine and measure the difference  
?)1( =−WWCertain   
The answer  W(1) ≠ WCertain  to the modified Aczél–Luce question means that 
the function  W(p)  has a discontinuity at  p=1.  This is not a quantitative but a 
qualitative, moreover, a topological feature. So, the answer to the question can 
qualitatively change the situation in utility and prospect theories, at least in their 
mathematical aspects.  
So, the modified Aczél–Luce question supposes the possibility of the 
existence of a discontinuity of the probability weighting function  W(p)  at the 
probability  p = 1.   
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The above purely mathematical theorems predict that, under the condition of a 
non-zero dispersion of the data, the probability  p  cannot take on the value  1,  i.e.,  
p < 1.   
One may additionally suppose here, that if the probability weighting function  
W(p) ≤ p  at  p > 3/4  and  WCertain = 1,  then this opens up a possibility of the 
existence of a discontinuity of  W(p)  at  p = 1.  So, one may say the theorems 
predict the possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of the probability 
weighting function  W(p)  at the probability  p = 1,  under the condition of a non-
zero dispersion of the data.  
Note, the theorems and the additional supposition radically contradict the 
accepted view. But they do not really contradict the majority of the existing utility 
and prospect theories and models. Moreover, the consequences of the theorems can 
be added to these theories and models as technical corrections of the probability, 
due to dispersion in the data or noises. At first, the correction can be roughly chosen 
as a linear addition, biased down to the probability  p = 0,  according to the 
hypothesis of an uncertain future (see, e.g., Harin, 2007). Such a correction can 
seem to be a straight-line approximation of the middle (roughly linear) part of the 
probability weighting curve from the middle to the borders. 
 
 
4.  Experiments and a “certain–uncertain” inconsistency  
 
Instead of the predictions of the theorems, experiments seem not to support 
these predictions.   
The prevalent experimental procedure in utility and prospect theories (and 
particularly in these experiments) is the random-lottery incentive system (see, e.g., 
Starmer, 2000 and Baltussen et al., 2012; etc.).   
Harin (2014) emphasizes that in the random-lottery incentive system, the 
choices of certain (sure) outcomes are stimulated by uncertain lotteries.  
This inconsistency is quite evident but has not yet been mentioned in the 
literature (see, e.g., von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengstrom, 2011; Andreoni and 
Sprenger, 2012; Vossler, Doyon and Rondeau, 2012; Baltussen et al., 2012). The 
inconsistency was revealed in the recent report Harin (2014). The present article 
develops this report.  
Because of this “certain–uncertain” inconsistency, the deductions from a 
random-lottery incentive experiment that includes a certain outcome cannot be 
unquestionably correct, especially at  p ~ 1.   
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5.  Experimental evidence  of Starmer and Sugden 
 
One can see the following in the description of the well-known experiment of 
Starmer and Sugden (1991):  
Page 974: “For groups A and D, this page began with an underlined text 
stating that question 22 would be played for real. For groups B and C, the 
corresponding text stated that one of the two questions would be played for real and 
that which question was to played out would be decided at the end of the 
experiment in the following way. The subject would roll a six-sided die. If the 
number on the die was 1, 2, or 3, then question 21 would be played; if the number 
was 4, 5, or 6, question 22 would be played.” 
“One problem, which we shall call P', required a choice between two lotteries 
R' (for "riskier") and S' (for "safer"). R' gave a 0.2 chance of winning ₤10.00 and a 
0.75 chance of winning ₤7.00 (with the residual 0.05 chance of winning nothing); S' 
gave ₤7.00 for sure.” 
So, in the R'-S' problem, R' gives  ₤10.00*0.2+₤7.00*0.75 = ₤7.25.  S' gives  
₤7.00*1 = ₤7.00.  Here  R' = ₤7.25>S' = ₤7.00.   
Let us consider the results from table 2 on Page 976, those are of interest here 
(the boldface is my own): 
• Group = B, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 19:21 
• Group = C, Incentive = Random lottery, R':S' = 22:18 
• Group = D, Incentive = P' real,  R':S' = 13:27 
One can evidently see that the results for P' real incentive  (13:27)  differ 
essentially from those for random lottery incentive  (19:21  and  22:18).   
Therefore, the experiment shows that the random lottery incentives can 
essentially modify subjects’ choices in comparison with the real incentives, when 
these choices include certain outcomes and the probability  (0.2 + 0.75 = 0.95 ~ 1)  
of the uncertain choices is near the border of the probability scale.  
Let us evaluate the percentage of the subjects choosing the uncertain outcome 
and the direction of the modification of  W(p).  The total number of the subjects in 
each group is equal to  40=19+21=22+18=13+27.  So, the percentage is equal to  
19/40=48%,  22/40=55%  and  13/40=33%.  One may see that the modification of  
W(p)  by the random lottery incentives is directed from  13/40=33%  to  19/40=48%  
and 22/40=55%.  That is it is directed from  0  to  1.  So, this supports the feasibility 
of the random lottery incentives’ hiding a possible discontinuity of  W(p)  and 
causing the inverse S-shaped curve of  W(p).   
So, the experiment of Starmer and Sugden (1991) evidently supports:  
1. The “certain–uncertain” inconsistency. 
2. The possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of  W(p)  at the probability  
p = 1.   
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Conclusions 
 
A possibility of the existence of a discontinuity of Prelec’s (probability 
weighting) function  W(p)  at the probability  p = 1   is discussed.   
Aczél and Luce (2007) emphasized a fundamental question (the Aczél–Luce 
question): whether  W(1) = 1  (whether Prelec’s weighting function  W(p)  (see 
Prelec, 1998) is equal to  1  at  p = 1).   
In the present paper, two values of the probability weighting function  W(p)  
are specified:  
• WCertain  for a certain outcome and 
• W(1),  as the limit of the probability weighting function  W(p)  for the 
uncertain outcome when  p  tends to  1   
)(lim)1(
1
pWW
p→
≡  .  
The Aczél–Luce question whether  W(1)=1  is modified to the question 
whether  W(1)=WCertain.  The answer  
CertainWW ≠)1(    
means a discontinuity of  W(p)  at the probability  p=1.  This is a new topological 
feature. Therefore, it can qualitatively change the utility and prospect theories, at 
least in their mathematical aspects.  
Purely mathematical theorems (see, e.g., Harin, 2012b), under the condition of 
a non-zero dispersion of data, prove the probability  p  cannot attain the value  1  or 
even approach it arbitrarily closely, and predict the possibility of the existence of a 
discontinuity of the probability weighting function  W(p)  at  p = 1.   
The well-known experiment of Starmer and Sugden (1991) supports this 
possibility.   
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